How Well Does the US Social Insurance System Provide Social Insurance? by Mark Huggett & Juan Carols Parra
How Well Does the U.S. Social Insurance System
Provide Social Insurance? ∗
Mark Huggett and Juan Carlos Parra
Georgetown University
Abstract
We analyze the insurance provided by the U.S. social security and income tax system
within a model where agents receive idiosyncratic, wage-rate shocks that are privately
observed. We consider two reforms: a piecemeal reform that optimally chooses the
social security beneﬁt function and a radical reform which eliminates the entire social
insurance system and replaces it with an optimal tax on lifetime earnings. The radical
reform outperforms the piecemeal reform and achieves nearly all of the maximum
possible welfare gain when wages diﬀer permanently over the lifetime. When wage
shocks match properties in U.S. data, the piecemeal reform outperforms the radical
reform.
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1“From the point of view of insurance, there seem to me to be two compelling theoretical
arguments for having the State rather than the market provide a wide range of insurance, for
old-age pensions, disability and sickness, unemployment and low income: the ﬁrst is that the
market handles adverse selection badly. The second is that, even if adverse selection were
not important, people should take out insurance at an age when they are incapable of doing
so rationally, namely zero.” - Mirrlees (1995, p. 384)
I. Introduction
One rationale for a government-provided, insurance system is the provision of insurance for
risks that are not easily insured in private markets. One can ﬁnd this rationale in textbooks,
in public policy documents and in the work of prominent economists.1
An important risk that is often discussed in the context of social insurance is labor income
risk. Individual workers experience substantial variation in wage rates which are not related
to systematic life-cycle variation or to aggregate ﬂuctuations.2 A common view is that labor
income is not easily insured because it is partly under an individual’s control by the choice of
unobserved eﬀort or unobserved labor hours and because a component of labor income risk
is realized at a young age. It is often claimed that a progressive income tax system together
with a progressive social security system may provide valuable insurance. The Economic
Report of the President (2004, Ch. 6) claims that the progressive relationship between
monthly social security beneﬁt payments in the U.S. and a measure of lifetime labor income
may be an important source of insurance.
We provide a benchmark analysis of how well a stylized version of the U.S. social insurance
system provides social insurance. We do so by determining the maximum possible gain to
superior insurance. We analyze only the retirement component of the social security system,
treat social security together with income taxation as the entire social insurance system and
focus only on a single but very important source of risk. The risk that is examined here is
idiosyncratic, wage-rate risk.
Our methodology involves the analysis of two decision problems. One decision problem
1See Rosen (2002, Ch. 9), The Economic Report of the President (2004, Ch. 6) and Mirrlees (1995).
2See Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008) or Kaplan (2007).
2is that of a cohort of ex-ante identical agents. Each agent maximizes expected utility in the
presence of the model social insurance system. It is assumed that asset markets transfer
resources over time and that the social insurance system (i.e. social security and income
taxation) is the only way to transfer resources across diﬀerent histories of wage shocks. We
then contrast the ex-ante expected utility in the model insurance system with the maximum
ex-ante expected utility that a planner could deliver to this cohort. The planner uses no
more resources in present-value terms than are used by a cohort in a solution to the model
insurance system. The planner is also restricted to choose allocations that are incentive
compatible. The incentive problem arises from the fact that the planner observes each
agent’s earnings but not an agent’s hours of work or an agent’s wage.
The model we analyze is closely related to the work of Kaplan (2007). He ﬁrst estimates
a process for male wages that accounts for the variation in mean wages and the idiosyncratic
component of wages over the life cycle. He then estimates preference parameters to best
match moments characterizing the distribution of consumption, hours and wages over the
life cycle. The main deviation from Kaplan’s model is that we replace the proportional tax
rates on labor and capital income in his model with the structure of the U.S. social security
system and the U.S. federal income tax system.
We analyze two versions of this model. The full model captures the pattern of permanent,
persistent and purely temporary idiosyncratic wage variation estimated from U.S. data,
whereas the permanent-shock model shuts down the variance in the persistent and temporary
shock components. The analysis of the permanent-shock model is motivated in part because
we can solve the planner’s problem for this model but not for the full model. Thus, we
calculate maximum welfare gains to superior insurance only for the permanent-shock model.
However, we calculate optimal parametric policy reforms in both models.
We ﬁnd that the maximum welfare gain to improved insurance in the permanent-shock
model is large. The maximum welfare gain is equivalent to a 4.09 percent increase in con-
sumption each model period. Important diﬀerences in time spent working are behind this
welfare gain. Speciﬁcally, high productivity agents work too little and low productivity
agents work too much under the U.S. system as compared to the solution to the planning
problem.
3One reason for these diﬀerences in work time is that the pattern of intratemporal wedges
in the planning problem diﬀers markedly from the wedges under the U.S. system. In the
planning problem, the wedge between the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution and
the wage rate is zero for the highest wage agents at each age and increases as an agent’s
wage rate falls. Thus, the greatest wedge at each age is for the lowest productivity agent. In
the U.S. system, the pattern of wedges is exactly the opposite because marginal income tax
rates are progressive and because the social security beneﬁt function is concave in a measure
of lifetime earnings.3
We explore two main reforms. First, we conduct an optimal piecemeal reform by allow-
ing the social security beneﬁt function to be chosen optimally without changing the social
security tax rate or the income tax system. This reform leads to almost no welfare gain
in the permanent-shock model but a welfare gain equivalent to a 1.15 percent consumption
increase each period in the full model.
The second reform is more radical. We eliminate the model social insurance system and
replace it with an optimal tax on the present value of earnings. An optimal present-value tax
achieves a welfare gain of 3.95 percent of consumption in the permanent-shock model - nearly
all of the maximum possible welfare gain. The present-value tax performs so well because it
approximates the wedges between marginal rates of substitution and transformation arising
in a solution to the planning problem while allowing for a ﬂexible relationship between
lifetime earnings and lifetime consumption. In the full model this optimal reform leads
to no welfare gain. Thus, while a present-value tax is well designed for models with only
permanent labor productivity diﬀerences that remain over the entire lifetime it does not
lead to a welfare gain in models with permanent, persistent and temporary sources of labor
productivity variation that mimic properties in U.S. wage data.
Two literatures are most closely related to the analysis in this paper. First, there is the
dynamic contract theory literature which analyzes optimal planning problems in which some
key information is only privately observed.4 Our work is similar in spirit to Hopenhayn and
3Average tax rates on lifetime earnings are substantially more progressive in a solution to the planning
problem than in the model of the U.S. system. Thus, the large welfare gain originates both from too little
progression in lifetime taxation and from the wrong pattern of marginal tax rates at each age.
4This work builds upon Mirrlees (1971). Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning (2006) review the recent
4Nicolini (1997), Wang and Williamson (2002) and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006). These
papers analyze optimal planning problems and stylized social insurance systems. Second,
there is the literature on social security systems with idiosyncratic risk (e.g. Imrohoroglu,
Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995), Huggett and Ventura (1999) and Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron (1999)). Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) is one interesting paper from this literature.
They consider various ways of partially privatizing the U.S. social security system. They
ﬁnd important eﬃciency gains when they abstract from idiosyncratic wage risk. When
idiosyncratic risk is added, they ﬁnd either no eﬃciency gains or very small gains for the
reforms they analyze.
Our ﬁndings paint a diﬀerent picture. We ﬁnd that the maximum welfare gain to improved
insurance substantially increases as the magnitude of idiosyncratic wage risk increases. Our
work diﬀers from Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) in at least two main ways. First, we focus
on ex-ante welfare as is common in the contract theory literature rather than the ex-interim
notion they use. This allows us to assess insurance provision over shocks realized early in life.
Second, the methodology diﬀers as we solve for allocations maximizing ex-ante welfare rather
than trying particular reforms. This methodology allows one to determine if the maximum
possible welfare gain is large or small and to determine which reforms are well focused. It
also allows one to take steps towards designing superior insurance systems simply because
properties of solutions to the planning problem are known in advance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework. Section 3 sets model




An agent’s preferences over consumption and labor allocations over the life cycle are given


















Consumption and labor allocations are denoted (c,l)=( c1,...,cJ,l 1,...,lJ). Consumption
and labor at age j =1 ,...,J are functions cj : Sj → R+ and lj : Sj → [0,1] mapping j-period
shock histories sj ∈ Sj into consumption and labor decisions. The set of possible j-period
histories is denoted Sj = {sj =( s1,...,sj):si ∈ S,i =1 ,...,j},w h e r eS is a ﬁnite set of
shocks. P(sj) is the probability of history sj. An agent’s labor productivity in period j,o r
equivalently at age j, is given by a function ω(sj,j) mapping the period shock sj and the
agent’s age j into labor productivity - eﬀective units of labor input per unit of time worked.
B. Incentive Compatibility
Labor productivity is observed only by the agent. The principal observes the earnings of
the agent which equals the product of a wage rate, labor productivity and work time. In
this context, the Revelation Principle implies that the allocations (c,l) that can be achieved
between a principal and an agent are precisely those that are incentive compatible.5
We now deﬁne incentive compatible allocations. For this purpose, consider the report
function σ ≡ (σ1,...,σJ), where σj maps shock histories sj ∈ Sj into S. The truthful report
function σ∗ has the property that σ∗
j(sj)=sj in any period for any j-period history. An
allocation (c,l)i sincentive compatible (IC) provided that the truthful report function always
gives at least as much expected utility to the agent as any other feasible report function.6
5See Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, Prop. 23.C.1).
6A report function σ is feasible for (c,l)p r o v i d e d( 1 )ω(sj,j) is always large enough to produce the output
required by a report (i.e. 0 ≤ lj(ˆ sj)ω(σj(sj),j) ≤ ω(sj,j),∀j,∀sj,w h e r eˆ sj ≡ (σ1(s1),...,σj(sj))) and (2) σ
maps true histories into reported histories that can occur with positive probability.
6The expected utility of an allocation (c,l) under a report function σ is denoted W(c,l;σ,s1).7





















This paper focuses on two decision problems: the U.S. social insurance problem and the
planning problem. These problems have the same objective but diﬀerent constraint sets.
V us and V pp denote the maximum ex-ante, expected utility achieved.













and xj+1 = Fj(xj,wω(sj,j)lj,c j),x 1 ≡ 0}










≤ Cost and (c,l)i sI C}
The constraint set Γus is speciﬁed by a tax function Tj and a law of motion Fj for a vector
of state variables xj. The tax function states the agent’s tax payment at age j as a function of
period earnings wω(sj,j)lj and the state variables xj. Earnings equal the product of a wage
rate w per eﬃciency unit of labor, labor productivity ω(sj,j) and work time lj. Allocations
in Γus have the property that the present value of consumption is no more than the present
7W(c,l;σ,s1) is deﬁned only for ω(sj,j) > 0. Later in the paper, we will set labor productivity to zero
beyond a retirement age. It is then understood that labor supply is set to zero at those ages.
7value of labor earnings less net taxes for any history of labor-productivity shocks.8 The next
section demonstrates that this abstract formulation can capture important features of the
U.S. social security and income tax system.
The constraint set Γpp for the planning problem has two restrictions. First, the expected
present value of consumption less labor income cannot exceed some speciﬁed value, denoted
Cost.W es e tCost to the present value of resources extracted from a cohort in a solution





(1+r)j−1 ]. As all shocks are
idiosyncratic, a known fraction of agents P(sj) in a cohort receives any shock history sj ∈
Sj. Thus, while the resources extracted from a single agent over the lifetime is potentially
random, the resources extracted from a large cohort is not random. Second, allocations (c,l)
must be incentive compatible (IC).
Ex-ante expected utility can be ordered in these problems so that V pp ≥ V us.T h e
argument is based on showing that if the allocation (cus,l us) achieves the maximum, then
(cus,l us)i sa l s oi nΓ pp.S i n c e ( cus,l us) satisﬁes the present value condition in Γus,t h e ni t
also satisﬁes the expected present value condition in Γpp b yt h ec h o i c eo fCost.I tr e m a i n s
to argue that (cus,l us) is incentive compatible. However, the fact that (cus,l us)i sa no p t i m a l
choice implies that it is incentive compatible.
D. Model Tax-Transfer System
The tax function and law of motion (Tj,F j) are now speciﬁed to capture features of U.S.
social security and federal income taxation. The tax function Tj is the sum of social security
taxes T ss
j and income taxes T inc
j . The state variable xj =( x1
j,x 2
j)i nTj has two components:
x1
j is an agent’s average earnings up to period j and x2












8The constraint set can equivalently be formulated as a sequence of budget restrictions where the agent
has access to a risk-free asset, starts life with zero units of this asset and must end life with non-negative
asset holding.
81. Social Security
The model social security system taxes an agent’s labor income before a retirement age
R and pays a social security transfer at and after the retirement age. Speciﬁcally, taxes
are proportional to labor earnings (wω(sj,j)lj) for earnings up to a maximum taxable level
emax. The social security tax rate is denoted by τ. Earnings beyond the maximum taxable
level are not taxed. At and after the retirement age, a transfer b(x1) is given that is a ﬁxed
function of an accounting variable x1. The accounting variable is an equally-weightedaverage
of earnings before the retirement age R (i.e. x1
j+1 =[ m i n {wω(sj,j)lj,e max} +( j − 1)x1
j]/j).
The earnings that enter into the calculation of x1
j are capped at a maximum level emax.A f t e r







τ min{wω(sj,j)lj,e max} : j<R
−b(x1
j):j ≥ R
The relationship between average past earnings x1 and social security beneﬁts b(x1)i nt h e
model is shown in Figure 1. Beneﬁts are a piecewise-linear function of average past earnings.
Both average past earnings and beneﬁts are normalized in Figure 1 so that they are measured
as multiples of average earnings in the economy. The ﬁrst segment of the beneﬁt function in
Figure 1 has a slope of .90, whereas the second and third segments have slopes equal to .32
and .15. The bend points in Figure 1 occur at 0.21 and 1.29 times average earnings in the
economy. The variable emax is set equal to 2.42 times average earnings.
We set the bend points and the maximum earnings emax equal to the actual multiples of
mean earnings used in the U.S. social security system. We also set the slopes of the beneﬁt
function equal to actual values.9 Figure 1 says that the social security retirement beneﬁt
payment is about 45 percent of mean earnings in the economy for a person whose average
9In the U.S. social security system, a person’s monthly retirement beneﬁt is based on a person’s averaged
indexed monthly earnings (AIME). For a person retiring in 2002, this beneﬁt equals 90% of the ﬁrst $592
of AIME, plus 32% of AIME between $592 and $3567, plus 15% of AIME over $3567. Dividing these “bend
points” by average earnings in 2002 and multiplying by 12 gives the bend points in Figure 1. Bend points
change each year based on changes in average earnings. The maximum taxable earnings from 1998-2002
averaged 2.42 times average earnings. All these facts, as well as average earnings data, come from the Social
Security Handbook (2003). The retirement beneﬁt above is for a single-person household. We abstract from
spousal beneﬁts.
9earnings over the lifetime equals mean earnings in the economy.
Two diﬀerences between the model system and the old-age component of the U.S. system
are the following:10
(i) The accounting variable in the U.S. system is an average of the 35 highest earnings
years, where the yearly earnings measure which is used to calculate the average is
capped at a maximum earnings level. 11 In the model, earnings are capped at a
maximum level just as in the actual system, but earnings in all pre-retirement years
are used to calculate average earnings.
(ii) In the U.S. system the age at which beneﬁts begin can be selected within some limits
with corresponding actuarial adjustments to beneﬁts. In the model the age R at which
retirement beneﬁts are ﬁrst received is ﬁxed.
2. Income Taxation
Income taxes in the model economy are determined by applying an income tax function
to a measure of an agent’s income. The empirical tax literature has calculated eﬀective tax
functions (i.e. the empirical relationship between taxes actually paid and income).12 We
use tabulations from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2004, Table 3A and Table 4A) for
the 2001 tax year to specify the relation between average eﬀective federal income tax rates
and income. Figure 2 plots average eﬀective tax rates for two types of households: head of
household is 65 or older and head of household is younger than 65. The horizontal axis in
Figure 2 measures income in 2001 dollars. Figure 2 shows that average federal income tax
rates increase strongly in income.
In the model economy, we choose income taxes T inc
j (x1
j,x 2
j,wω(sj,j)lj) before and after
the retirement age R to approximate the average tax rates in Figure 2. We proceed in
10We do not try to capture the degree to which the progressivity of the old-age component of social security
is mitigated by a positive correlation between survival rates and earnings.
11The 35 highest years are calculated on an indexed basis in that indexed earnings in a given year equal
actual nominal earnings multiplied by an index. The index equals the ratio of mean earnings in the economy
when the individual turns 60 to mean earnings in the economy in the given year. In eﬀect, this adjusts
nominal earnings for inﬂation and real earnings growth.
12See, for example, Gouveia and Strauss (1994).
10three steps. First, we approximate the data in 2001 dollars with a continuous function.
Speciﬁcally, we use the quadratic function passing through the origin that minimizes the
squared deviations of the tax function from data. This gives average tax functions before
and after the retirement age. Second, we express model income in 2001 dollars.13 Third,
the average tax rates on model income are given by the function estimated in the ﬁrst step
after expressing model income in 2001 dollars. Model income equals the sum of labor income
wω(sj,j)lj, asset income x2
jr and social security transfer income bj(x1
j), where initial assets
are zero (i.e. x2
1 =0 ) .
13This is done using the ratio between the average U.S. earnings and average model earnings. The ﬁgure
for average U.S. earnings is $32,921. This comes from the beneﬁt calculation section of the Social Security
Handbook (2003).
11III. Parameter Values
The results of the paper are based upon the parameter values in Table 1. Model parame-
ters are principally set equal to the values estimated by Kaplan (2007). The goal of Kaplan’s
work is to understand many dimensions of cross-sectional inequality from the perspective
of a standard, incomplete-markets model with endogenous labor supply. Model parame-
ters are estimated to account for the cross-sectional, variance-covariance patterns of hours,
consumption and wages at diﬀerent ages over the life cycle.14
One key departure from Kaplan’s model is that our tax-transfer system diﬀers. We
consider a tax-transfer system that captures features of social security and federal income
taxation. Thus, net marginal tax rates will vary with an agent’s age and state. Capital and
labor taxes in Kaplan’s work are proportional taxes that are age and state invariant.15
Table 1: Parameter Values
There are J = 56 model periods in an agent’s life. Retirement occurs at model period
R = 41. At the retirement age labor productivity is zero and an agent starts collecting social
security beneﬁts. One model period corresponds to one year. Thus, we view the agent as
starting the working life at a real-life age of 25, retiring at age 65 and dying after age 80.
An agent’s labor productivity is ω(sj,j)=μj exp(s1
j+s2
j+s3
j). The wage at age j is deter-
mined by a ﬁxed wage rate w per eﬃciency unit of labor and by labor productivity ω(sj,j).
Labor productivity is given by a deterministic component μj and by an idiosyncratic shock
component sj =( s1
j,s 2
j,s 3
j) which captures permanent, persistent and temporary sources of
productivity diﬀerences. The permanent component s1 stays ﬁxed for an agent over the life
cycle and is distributed N(−σ2
1/2,σ2
1). The persistent component follows an autoregressive
process s2
j = ρs2
j−1 + ηj, ηj ∼ N(0,σ2
2). The temporary component s3
j is independent across
periods and is distributed N(−σ2
3/2,σ2
3).
14Heathcote et al. (2008) analyze a related model with time-varying variances of diﬀerent components of
wages to account for the change in cross-sectional hours, wage, earnings and consumption inequality in the
U.S. over time.
15There are two other departures. First, we do not allow for heterogeneity in the preference parameters.
Second, the working lifetime is 40 years rather than the 38 years in Kaplan (2007). We thank Greg Kaplan
for providing his estimates of the mean productivity proﬁle based upon 40 working years.
12We consider a benchmark model with only permanent shocks as well as a full model with
all three stochastic components. The parameters are set to estimates from Kaplan (2007).
A one standard deviation permanent shock leads to about a 24 percent permanent change
in wages, whereas a one standard deviation innovation to the persistent component changes
wages by about 14 percent. The persistent shock is set to zero for each agent at the beginning
of the working life cycle. The deterministic wage component μj i sg i v e ni nF i g u r e3 . T h i s
component implies that wages approximately double over the life cycle. We approximate
each productivity process with a discrete number of shocks.16





Utility function parameters are set equal to Kaplan’s estimates. The coeﬃcient of relative





l so that the Frisch elasticity is 0.27 evaluated at l = .4). These values lie well
within a range of values estimated in the literature based upon micro-level consumption and
labor data - see Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999). The value φ =0 .13 is the mean
value estimated by Kaplan.
One important restriction on the utility function u(c,l) is the assumption of additive
separability. Much of the literatureon dynamic contract theory with a labor decision employs
this assumption. We make use of this assumption when we design a procedure to compute
solutions to the planning problem.17
The parameters of the model tax-transfer system are set to capture features of social
security and federal income taxation in the U.S. Thus, the social security tax rate τ is set to
equal 10.6 percent of earnings. This is the combined employee-employer tax for the old-age
and survivor’s insurance component of social security. The social security beneﬁt function
b(x) and the income tax function T inc
j are given by Figure 1 and Figure 2, which were
16We approximate the permanent component with 5 equally-spaced points in logs on the interval
[−σ2
1/2 − 3σ1,−σ2
1/2+3 σ1]. Following Tauchen (1986), probabilities are set to the area under the nor-
mal distribution, where midpoints between the approximating points deﬁne the limits of integration. The
persistent component is approximated with 3 equally-spaced points on the interval [−4σ2,4σ2]. Transition
probabilities are calculated following Tauchen (1986). The temporary component is approximated with 2
values.
17It is used in Theorem A1 in the Appendix to establish which incentive constraints bind and to reduce
dimensionality when we compute solutions to the permanent-shock problem.
13discussed in the previous section.
The model is explicitly a partial equilibrium model in that wage w per eﬃciency unit of
labor and the real interest rate r are exogenous. They do not vary as we consider alternative
social insurance arrangements. Nevertheless, we choose the value of the agent’s discount
factor β so that a steady state of a general equilibrium version of the full model produces
the interest rate r = .042 in Table 1. This interest rate is the average of the real return to
stock and to long-term bonds over the period 1946-2001 (see Siegel (2002, Tables 1-1 and
1-2)). The value of the wage w in the model is then set to the value consistent with the
factor inputs that produce this real return as explained in the Appendix.18
Figure 4 displays the evolution of the variance of (log) wages, earnings, work hours and
consumption within the full model. The dispersion in wages early in life reﬂects the sum of
the permanent and temporary components of productivity. The rise in wage dispersion with
age reﬂects the role of persistent shocks. The dispersion in earnings over the life cycle closely
mimics the pattern for wages. One reason for this is that, absent preference heterogeneity,
the model produces little dispersion in work hours. The rise in consumption dispersion over
the life cyclereﬂects mainly the role of persistent shocks. The levelsof consumption, earnings
and wage dispersion are lower at all ages within the full model compared to the U.S. facts
documented in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2005). This is because Kaplan (2007)
analyzes residual dispersion - dispersion after controlling for observable sources of variation
such as those related to diﬀerences in education - rather than total dispersion. Although
the estimate of the permanent wage shock variance is reduced compared to the estimates in
Heathcote et al. (2008), the parameters related to persistent and temporary shocks are not
greatly aﬀected.
18The notion of a steady state and how to compute it is standard and follows Huggett (1996). This involves
choosing an aggregate production function and setting factor prices to marginal products. The Appendix
describes in detail how this is carried out.
14IV. Analyzing Welfare Gains
This section analyzes welfare gains within the permanent-shock model.
A. Maximum Welfare Gains
The maximum welfare gain to improved insurance is measured by the percentage increase
α in consumption in the allocation (cus,l us) solving the U.S. social insurance problem so
that ex-ante expected utility is the same as in an allocation (cpp,l pp) solving the planning
problem.19 These allocations use the same expected present value of resources. This calcu-
lation is shown below. The results of this section are based on computing solutions to each

























Figure 5 highlights the maximum welfare gains attainable for a range of values of the
variance of the permanent component of wage shocks. Figure 5 shows that the welfare gain
is increasing in this variance. This is true both when the model social insurance system only
includes social security and when the model social insurance system includes both social
security and income taxation.
To quantify the size of the maximum welfare gain, we need an estimate of this variance.
Kaplan (2007) estimates that σ2
1 = .056 for permanent shocks. Thus, a one standard devia-
tion shock increases wages permanently over the lifetime by about 24 percent. Heathcote et
al. (2008) estimate a wage process with a similar structure to Kaplan (2007) but ﬁnd that
σ2
1 = .109. One reason for this diﬀerence is that in a ﬁrst stage regression Kaplan controls
for permanent diﬀerences in wages related to education whereas Heathcote et al. do not. It
is valuable to keep both estimates in mind in viewing Figure 5a. Using Kaplan’s estimate,
19When the range of the period utility function of consumption is not bounded from above, then there
is always a value α solving this equation. The utility to consumption is bounded above by zero for the
period utility function in Table 1. Nevertheless, as Figure 4 highlights, α is well deﬁned for all the examples
analyzed.
15Figure 5a shows that the maximum welfare gain in the model of the combined social security
and income tax system is equivalent to a 4.1 percent increase in consumption each period.
The analysis in Figure 5a is based upon the idea that while earnings are publicly observed
both individual hours of work and individual wage rates are only privately observed. This
implies that any mechanism determining consumption and labor over the lifetime must
respect the incentive compatibility constraints. Figure 5b describes how important private
information is for limiting the size of the gains to superior insurance. Figure 5b plots the
maximum welfare gain in the economy with social security and income taxation when wage
rates are private information and when they are public information. At the value σ2
1 = .056,
the maximum welfare gain under public information is equivalent to a 6.1 percent change
in consumption at each age. This gain is achieved by having all agents of a given age
consume the same amount despite large diﬀerences in earnings across agents with diﬀerent
productivities.
The remainder of section 4 develops an understanding of what lies behind the patterns
in Figure 5. In doing so, the following questions are addressed: (1) How do patterns of
lifetime taxation diﬀer in the two problems?, (2) To what degree can welfare be improved
by reallocating consumption, ﬁxing the labor allocation?, (3) How do marginal rates of
substitution in the model insurance system diﬀer from those in the planning problem? and
(4) Why does the welfare gain increase as the shock variance increases?
B. Patterns of Lifetime Taxation
To get a preliminary idea of the economics behind the maximum welfare gains, it is useful
to examine patterns of lifetime taxation. Figure 6 graphs the present value of earnings and
consumption for agents at each of the ﬁve values of the permanent shock. This is done both
in the model social insurance system and in the planning problem for the benchmark variance
of σ2
1 = .056. Figure 6 shows that lifetime taxation is progressive in both allocations in that
the ratio of the present value of consumption to the present value of earnings falls as lifetime
earnings increase. Furthermore, there is much more progression in lifetime average tax rates
in the planning allocation than in the allocation under the model social insurance system.
One additional feature of Figure 6 is that both allocations involve extracting resources in
16present-value terms from a cohort. This last point is clear as the lifetime tax patterns under
the model social insurance system is below the 45 degree line for agents at all permanent
shock levels.20
A quick look at Figure 6 reveals that the labor allocation must be quite diﬀerent across
these two allocations as the present value of earnings diﬀers sharply. To highlight this, we
plot work time over the life cycle. Figure 7 shows that in the planning problem the highest
productivity shock agents work the greatest fraction of time and the lowest productivity
shock agents work the least. In the model social insurance system this pattern of work time
is exactly reversed.
One issue raised by Figures 6 and 7 is the extent to which the maximum welfare gains arise
from simply reallocating consumption across agents with diﬀerent permanent shocks, holding
the labor allocation ﬁxed. The remaining gains are related to changing work time. Thus, if
it were possible to raise the consumption of low shock agents and lower that of high shock
agents, how far would such a reallocation go to improving welfare? While such a reallocation
would improve ex-ante utility because the utility function is concave in consumption, this
reallocation can only be pushed up to the point where the incentive constraints bind.
To answer this question, we calculate the new allocation (c∗,l us) which maximizes ex-ante
utility, holding labor ﬁxed at lus, while imposing incentive compatibility and the present
value resource constraint. We ﬁnd that at the benchmark value σ2 = .056 the new allocation
(c∗,l us) increases welfare over (cus,l us)b y2 .9 percent, compared to a maximum 4.09 percent
achieved in the planning problem. Thus, important parts of the maximum welfare gain are
due both to reallocating consumption and changing the labor allocation.
C. Analyzing Wedges
We now try to better understand the sources of the welfare gains documented in Figure 5.
To do so, we focus on the wedges between marginal rates of substitution and transformation.
One wedge is the intratemporal wedge between the consumption-leisure marginal rate of
20Intuitively, a pay-as-you-go social security system alone should extract resources from current and future
birth cohorts to pay for “free” beneﬁts to previous cohorts. Fullerton and Rogers (1993, Table 4-14) calculate
that lifetime average tax rates in the U.S. are roughly progressive in lifetime income and that resources are
extracted in present-value terms from the cohorts they analyze.
17substitution and the agent’s wage. The other wedge is the intertemporal wedge between the
marginal rate of substitution of consumption intertemporally and the gross interest rate. We
will see shortly that the diﬀerences in work hours across the two problems turn out to be
related to the diﬀerences in the intratemporal wedge.
Consider ﬁrst the social insurance problem. The income tax system causes the marginal
rate of substitution of consumption intertemporally to be below the gross interest rate. In
fact, the progressivity of the income tax system, previously documented in Figure 2, implies
that within the model the intertemporal wedge is greatest for high productivity agents.
These are the agents who end up receiving high incomes.
Consider next the intratemporal wedge. Figure 8 graphs the ratio of the intratemporal
marginal rate of substitution to the agents wage for each value of the permanent shock.21
Any deviation of this ratio from unity will be labeled a wedge.
Within an age group, Figure 8 shows that this wedge increases as an agent’s wage and
productivity increases. The wedge is smallest for low productivity agents for two reasons.
First, these agents have relatively low incomes and marginal income tax rates are relatively
low at low income levels. Second, the nature of the social security system implies that at
any age the marginal tax rate on additional earnings arising from social security increases
as an agent’s productivity shock increases.
This second point merits some discussion. The marginal tax rate mentioned above equals
the social securitytax rate τ lessthe present value of marginal social security beneﬁts incurred
from an extra unit of earnings. This applies to agents who are below the maximum taxable
earnings level. This second component diﬀers across agents within the same age group. The
reason is that agents in the model will anticipate ending up on diﬀerent sections of the social
security beneﬁt function. High productivity agents will end up on the ﬂat part of the social
security beneﬁt function and thus will incur a low marginal beneﬁt in present value. The
situation is reversed for low productivity agents as they will end up on the steep part of the
beneﬁt function. This reasoning implies that marginal tax rates arising from social security
increase with productivity within the model.22
21Recall from section 3 that the wage rate in the permanent-shock model is wω(s,j)=wμjexp(s1)a n d
that there are ﬁve equally-spaced shock values s1
1 <s 1
2 < ... < s1
5.
22A previous version of this paper calculated how the marginal tax rate arising from the model social
18We now analyze the nature of wedges that arise in a solution to the planning problem.
Solutions to the planning problem will involve some incentive compatibility constraint bind-
ing. As a consequence, at a solution it will not be true that all marginal rates of substitution
are equated to marginal rates of transformation.
While there is an intertemporal wedge in the model social insurance problem arising from
the income tax there is no intertemporal wedge in a solution to the planning problem. This
diﬀerence accounts for some of the welfare gains. To see why there is no intertemporal wedge
in the planning problem, assume that there is a solution with a wedge. If so, then it is possible
to deliver both the same expected utility and the same ex-post utilities at lower expected
present value cost, without changing the labor allocation. This can be done by eliminating
the intertemporal wedge. The extra resources saved can then be used to make a uniform
increase in utility to agents receiving all shocks while preserving incentive compatibility.23
Now consider the intratemporal wedge. The intratemporal marginal rate of substitution
will diﬀer from an agent’s wage rate in a solution to the planning problem depending on
which incentive constraints bind. It turns out that only the local downward incentive con-
straints hold with equality in a solution. These constraints require that an agent with a
given permanent shock weakly prefers his/her own allocation to the allocation received by
pretending to have the next lowest shock. An important consequence of this (see Theorem
A1 in the Appendix) is that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
labor is then strictly below the wage rate wω(s,j) in all periods for all agents except the
agent receiving the highest shock.24 For the agent with the highest shock, there is no gain
to distorting the consumption-labor margin at any age. The reason is that no other agent
envies the consumption and output allocation of this agent. All other agents get strictly
lower lifetime utility by pretending to be the high shock agent and allocating enough labor
security system varied with age for a median productivity agent. Early in life the marginal tax rate is
slightly below τ = .106. It decreases with age but remains positive at all ages. Broadly, our results are
similar to the marginal social security tax rates calculated by Feldstein and Samwick (1992, Table 1).
23Rogerson (1985) and Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003) present a necessary condition on this
margin in planning problems with a more general structure of shocks. Their main result is the “inverse”
Euler equation. The result stated in the text is a special case of their result as the inverse Euler equation
reduces to the claim made above, absent period-by-period shocks. With period-by-period shocks, a solution
to the planning problem will have an intertemporal wedge.
24A similar result holds in the one-period model studied by Mirrlees (1971).
19time to produce the higher output required.
Next, we examine the size of the intratemporal wedge. Figure 9 graphs the ratio of the
marginal rate of substitution to the agent’s wage rate at each age for each of the ﬁve possible
values of the permanent shock. Figure 9 shows that the intratemporal wedge is positive for
all agents with the exception of the agent with the highest permanent shock. Furthermore,
within an age group the magnitude of this wedge decreases as an agent’s wage increases.
In the context of the permanent-shock model, we are not aware of any existing theoretical
result which describes how the wedge at each age moves as productivity increases. However,
for the static Mirrleesmodel there are theoretical and computational results(see, for example,
Tuomala (1990), Saez (2001) and the references cited in these papers). In the Mirrlees model,
the lognormal distribution of productivity is important for wedges to decline as productivity
increases. We have computed the nature of wedges in the permanent-shock model when
we replace the lognormal distribution with a Pareto distribution. The literature has argued
that the upper tail of the earnings distribution has fat tails which are more in line with a
Pareto distribution. For the Pareto distribution with the same mean and variance, we ﬁnd
that wedges do not decrease as productivity increases.25
We conjecture that the diﬀerences in wedges and the diﬀerencesin lifetimetaxation are the
key reasons why the maximum welfare gains increase as labor productivity risk increases.
There is too little progression in lifetime taxation in the model social insurance system
compared to the planners problem as risk increases. Furthermore, the intratemporal wedge
on high productivity agents typically increases as risk increases in the model social insurance
system whereas the wedge on the highest productivity agents within an age group is always
zero in the planning problem.
25Following Tauchen (1986), we approximate a Pareto distribution with ﬁve equally-spaced points one
standard deviation apart. The resulting wedge is positive and displays little variation across ages. The
wedge for the lowest four shock levels averages approximately .12,.10,.16 and .20, in order of increasing
productivity. The wedge for the highest productivity level is approximately zero in computations.
20V. Reforming the Social Insurance System
We examine two ways to reform the model social insurance system. Reform 1 is a piece-
meal reform in which a component of the social insurance system is changed while maintain-
ing the remainder of the system. In Reform 1 we change the social security beneﬁt function
without changing income taxation or the social security tax rate. Reform 2 is a radical
reform as social security and income taxation are eliminated and are replaced with a tax on
the present value of earnings.
Reform 1 and 2 are optimal parametric reforms. In eachcase we searchover the parameters
of the respective tax functions to ﬁnd the parameter vectorwhichmaximizesex-ante expected
utility of the cohort of agents.26 In each reform the same present value of resources is
extracted from the cohort as in the original social insurance system. The Appendix describes
computational methods. The Appendix is also useful for understanding how to achieve a
tax on the present value of earnings using a period-by-period tax system. We note that a
present-value tax is compatible with the provision of retirement beneﬁts as such a tax can
be achieved with very diﬀerent timings of taxes and transfers over the lifetime.
A. Motivation
The policy literature is full of discussions of piecemeal reforms. In the social security
literature, it is common to ﬁnd the suggestion that the value of marginal social security
beneﬁts incurred by extra earnings should be more closely linked with marginal taxes paid
in order to improve eﬃciency or a welfare measure. These considerations motivate the
analysis of Reform 1 which is an optimal piecemeal reform that ﬂexibly changes the beneﬁt
function.
The motivation for Reform 2 is that it is simple and that there are reasons to think that
it might work well within the permanent-shock model. Within the permanent-shock model,
a present-value tax has two important properties. First, it imposes no intertemporal wedge.
Second, it imposes an age-invariant wedge on the intratemporal margin that can be made to
26Our analysis of optimal parametric reforms is similar in some respects to the work of Conesa, Kitao, and
Krueger (2009). They choose the parameters of a labor income tax function and a linear capital income tax
to maximize ex-ante lifetime utility in steady state.
21ﬂexibly diﬀer across agents.27 The previous section argued that the ﬁrst property holds in a
solution to the planning problem and that the second property is approximately supported
in computations.
B. Analysis
The welfare gain to each reform is given in Table 2. Welfare gains are stated in terms of
the permanent percentage increase in consumption in the allocation in the model without
the reform which is equivalent to the expected utility delivered under the optimal reform.
Welfare gains are calculated for both the full model (i.e the model with permanent, persistent
and temporary shocks) and the permanent-shock model.
Table 2: Welfare Gains to Optimal Parametric Reforms
We ﬁrst discuss the results for the permanent-shock model. For Reform 1, we calculate
the best constant beneﬁt, the best linear beneﬁt and the best quadratic beneﬁt as a function
of average lifetime earnings. The best constant beneﬁt function in the permanent-shock
model leads to a welfare gain of 0.14 percent. A constant social security beneﬁt increases the
progressivity of lifetime earnings taxation but also increases marginal earnings taxes across
earnings levels. The best linear beneﬁt function has a positive intercept and a negative slope
and leads to a welfare gain of 0.18 percent. The best quadratic beneﬁt function that we
ﬁnd does not improve welfare over the best linear function. This class of reforms achieves
only a small fraction of the maximum possible welfare gain. This occurs because these
reforms are poorly focused: greater progression in lifetime taxation is achieved by imposing
an even larger intratemporal wedge on high productivity agents and the change in the beneﬁt
function does not eliminate the wedge on the intertemporal consumption margin.
In contrast, an optimal present-value tax leads to a large welfare gain worth a 3.95 percent
increase in consumption. We obtain this result when the class of tax functions are increasing
27Werning (2007) shows that a present-value tax system is optimal in some contexts. Speciﬁcally, he
shows that such a tax implements a solution to a planning problem in the context of an inﬁnitely-lived agent
model where labor productivity takes on two possible values, labor productivity is private information and
preferences are of the constant Frisch elasticity of labor form.
22step functions. This reform achieves nearly all of the maximum possible welfare gain in the
permanent-shock model.
We highlight two reasons why the optimal present-value earnings tax works well in the
permanent-shock model. First, it allows for a ﬂexible choice of lifetime taxation. Indeed,
the graph of the present value of consumption as a function of the present value of earnings
which turns out to be optimal is essentially the pattern in the planning problem - previously
displayed in Figure 6. Second, the present-value tax is able to closely approximate the pattern
of intratemporal and intertemporal wedges found in a solution to the planning problem.28
We now discuss results for the full model. For Reform 1, the best constant, linear, and
quadratic beneﬁt functions lead to gains worth a 0.56,1.07 and 1.15 percent increase in
consumption, respectively. The best quadratic beneﬁt function has a positive intercept, but
negative values for the coeﬃcients on the slope and quadratic terms. Thus, the piecemeal
reform that maximizes ex-ante welfare does not involve more closely linking the value of
marginal beneﬁts received to marginal taxes paid. Greater progression in lifetime taxation is
achieved within this reform by increasing intratemporal wedges. For Reform 2 we ﬁnd that
in the full model the best present-value tax that is within the piecewise-linear class leads to a
small welfare loss equivalent to a 0.07 percent decrease in consumption. Thus, even though
a present-value tax is both a simple and well-focused reform within the permanent-shock
model, this class of reforms does not lead to welfare gains within the richer idiosyncratic
shock structure of the full model.
To get some insight into what is behind these results, we ﬁrst examine the pattern of
lifetime taxation. Figure 10 shows that the progression in lifetime taxation is greater in
Reform 1 and Reform 2 than in the benchmark model.29 Moreover, the pattern of lifetime
28At a deeper level, a present-value tax may work well within these economies for two quite diﬀerent
reasons. First, one might conjecture that interior solutions to the planning problem with (i) constant Frisch




1+γ ) and (ii) permanent proportional productivity
diﬀerences have the property that only local downward incentive constraints bind. If so, such allocations can
always be implemented by a present-value tax system. A key property of such a solution, given assumptions
(i)-(ii), is that the intratemporal wedge is age invariant - see the proof of Theorem A1(iii) in the Appendix.
Second, the preferences used in Table 1 may eﬀectively be close to those with constant Frisch elasticity of
labor.
29The 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of the present value of earnings distribution in the benchmark model
occur at values 10.7, 17.4 and 26.1 in Figure 10.
23taxation is broadly similar in both reforms over much of the domain. So the diﬀerence in
welfare gain between Reform 1 and Reform 2 does not seem to come from diﬀerences in this
measure of tax progression. The optimal present-value tax function in Reform 2 is roughly
linear over most of the domain but is eventually ﬂat well past the 99th percentile of the
distribution - this occurs at a present value of earnings equal to 45.
We now describe how the reforms impact consumption. Both reforms produce a downward
shift in the distribution of the present value of earnings compared to the benchmark model.
The result is that mean consumption at almost all ages is lower in both reforms than in the
benchmark model but, perhaps surprisingly, only Reform 1 substantially reduces measures of
the dispersion in consumption at all ages compared to the benchmark model. This implies
that the component of expected utility due to consumption is slightly lower in Reform 1
compared to the benchmark model but is even lower in Reform 2 compared to Reform 1 or
to the benchmark model.
Next we describe how the reforms impact work hours. Reform 1 reduces the mean hours
of work at all ages compared to the benchmark model and it produces about the same
coeﬃcient of variation in hours at all ages. Thus, the ex-ante utility from leisure is greater
in Reform 1 than in the benchmark model. Reform 2 reduces mean hours of work at all
ages below that in the benchmark model and below that in Reform 1. However, Reform 2
nearly doubles the coeﬃcient of variation of hours early in the life cycle compared to the
benchmark model. The overall eﬀect of Reform 2 is to increase the ex-ante utility from
leisure compared to the benchmark model. Both reforms increase the correlation between
work hours and labor productivity at all ages compared to the benchmark model. Figure
10 suggests that diﬀerent income eﬀects on high and low lifetime earnings agents is partly
behind the increase in correlation. This increase in correlation is a key part of the mechanism
within the permanent-shock model for achieving the maximum possible welfare gain.
We now consider Reform 3 to determine if an important part of the welfare gain obtained
by Reform 2 in the permanent-shock model comes simply from eliminating capital income
taxation and the associated intertemporal wedge. Reform 3 is a piecemeal reform that
maintains social security and income taxation but exempts capital income from entering
into taxable income. An additional proportional labor income tax is added to satisfy the
24present-value resource constraint. Eliminating capital income taxation in this way produces
a welfare gain of 0.22 percent in the permanent-shock model and a welfare loss of −0.22
percent in the full model. Thus, simply eliminating intertemporal wedges in this crude way,
without substantially increasing the progressivity of lifetime taxation or altering the pattern
of intratemporal wedges, does not go very far towards producing the maximum welfare gain
in the permanent-shock model.
All of the analysis in the paper is based upon the assumption that factor prices are
ﬁxed and do not change as the social insurance system is changed. We now take a step
towards determining how a closed-economy analysis might diﬀer by simply calculating how
the aggregate capital and labor evolve over time at ﬁxed factor prices within the full model.
We assume that each reform applies only to each successive cohort of newborn agents and
that all other agents who are alive at the start of the reform face the original social insurance
system. The original social insurance system was calibrated to be consistent with a steady
state in the full model with no government debt. We view any change in the capital-labor
ratio over time as reﬂecting a need for factor prices to adjust in a closed-economy analysis.
An increase in the ratio is viewed as a force which depresses the interest rate and raises the
wage rate.
In Reform 1 the capital-labor ratio changes by well under one percent over the ﬁrst 40
periods. In contrast, Reform 2 and 3 show much larger movements. After 40 periods this
ratio falls by 10 percent in Reform 2 and increases by 18 percent in Reform 3. This is due
almost entirely to the movement in the numerator - total asset holdings less government
debt. We conjecture that little of the welfare gains we ﬁnd for Reform 1 would vanish in
a closed-economy analysis simply because the large eﬀects at the individual level wash out
almost entirely for factor inputs both within age group and at the aggregate level. It is less
clear whether or not the results for Reform 2 and 3 would continue to hold.
In closing this section, we think that ﬁnding parametric tax systems that work well within
the full model is a useful problem. This problem connects the policy literature to the
literature on optimal taxation. We acknowledge that the tax systems that we have explored
can be improved upon as both reforms violate the inverse Euler equation which is a necessary
25condition on the intertemporal margin for a solution to the planning problem.30 Further
theoretical and computational work that give insight intowedges arising in planning problems
would be useful for ﬁnding parametric tax systems that produce larger welfare gains.
30Rogerson (1985) and Golosov et al. (2003) present the inverse Euler equation result. Kocherlakota
(2005) provides an implementation theorem for solutions to planning problems using this result.
26VI. Conclusion
The question of whether to or how to fundamentally redesign social security systems has
been and continues to be a major policy issue in the U.S. and in many other countries. One’s
position on this issue is likely to depend upon one’s view of the rationale for social security
and for social insurance more broadly. One standard rationale is the provision of insurance
for risks that are not easily insured in private markets.
We provide a quantitative analysis of the U.S. social insurance system within a framework
with important idiosyncratic, labor-market risks. We ﬁnd that large welfare gains to changing
the social insurance system are possible. Systems that can achieve such welfare gains need
not be more complicated than the current U.S. system. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that an optimal
tax on the present value of earnings does this within the model with only permanent shocks
and that changing only the social security beneﬁt function does this within the model with
permanent, persistent and purely temporary productivity shocks of the nature found in U.S.
wage rate data. These results are based upon maximizing ex-ante utility for a cohort. Thus,
the objective reﬂects an insurance role both for productivity diﬀerences present at the start
of the working lifetime as well as for productivity shocks occuring throughout the working
lifetime.
We mention three directions to pursue in future work. First, it would be valuable to know
quantitative properties of the solution to the planning problem within the full model. This
would require important theoretical and/or computational advances.31 Second, this paper
treats labor productivity as being unaﬀected by the social insurance system. We expect
that human capital models (e.g. Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2007)) will be central both
as positive models of inequality and as models for the analysis of social insurance issues.
Because skill acquisition responds to policy in human capital models, labor productivity
will not be policy invariant. Whether the gains to adopting superior systems are even larger
within such models is an open question. Third, future work might expand the analysis of the
social insurance system to go beyond income taxation and social security as well as provide
a closed-economy analysis to complement the open-economy analysis pursued in this work.
31Fernandes and Phelan (2000) provide a recursive formulation of a planning problem with persistent
shocks. Such a formulation is not computationally viable for the full model described in Table 1.
27Appendix A
The Appendix contains two sections. Section A.1 describes our methods for computing solutions to the
planning problem, the social insurance problem and the parametric planning problems. Section A.2 proves
Theorem A1. In the Appendix the labor-productivity function is sometimes set to ω(sj,j)=sj solely to
shorten and simplify expressions. FORTRAN programs that compute solutions to all the problems analyzed
in the paper are available upon request.
A.1. Computation
A.1.1. Social Insurance Problem
The social insurance problem is stated below as a dynamic programming problem. This involves re-
formulating the present value budget constraint as a sequence of budget constraints where resources are
transferred across periods with a risk-free asset. Risk-free asset holding must then always lie above period
and shock speciﬁc borrowing limits aj(s) consistent with solvency at the terminal age. The state variable
is x =( a,s,z), where a is asset holdings, s is the period shock vector determining productivity and z is
average past earnings. The functions Tj and Fj describe the tax system and the law of motion for average
past earnings. The shock is Markovian with transition probability π(s |s).
Vj(a,s,z)=m a x (c,l,a )u(c,l)+β
 
s  Vj+1(a ,s  ,z )π(s |s)
(1) c + a  ≤ a(1 + r)+wω(s,j)l − Tj(x,wω(s,j)l)
(2) c ≥ 0,a   ≥ aj(s);l ∈ [0,1]
(3) z  = Fj(z,wω(s,j)l)
This problem is solved computationally by backwards induction. The value function Vj is computed
at selected grid points (a,s,z) by solving the right-hand-side of Bellman’s equation. We use the simplex
method (see Press et al (1994)). Evaluating the right-hand-side of Bellman’s equation involves a bi-linear
interpolation of the function Vj+1(a ,s  ,z ) over the asset and average past earnings dimensions: (a ,z ). We
set the borrowing limit to a ﬁxed value a in each period. We then relax this value so that it is not binding.
This is a device for imposing period and state speciﬁc limits aj(s). To use this device, penalties are imposed
for states and decisions implying negative consumption.32
We compute ex-ante, expected utility V us and the expected cost, denoted Cost, of running the social
insurance system by simulation, under the assumption that an agent starts out with no assets. Speciﬁcally, we
draw a large number (100,000) of lifetime labor-productivity proﬁles, compute realized utility and realized
cost for each proﬁle, using the computed optimal decision rules, and then compute averages. The same
100,000 histories are used in the calculation of expected utility and expected cost in the analysis of reforms.
A.1.2. Steady State Calibration
We calibrate the discount factor β using the algorithm below. This algorithm is based on computing
a stationary equilibrium. To set up this framework, we assume that (i) there is an aggregate production
32The backward induction procedure takes as given a value for average earnings in the economy. This
value is used to determine the tax function Tj. Thus, an additional loop is needed so that guessed and
implied values of average earnings coincide.
28function Y = F(K,L)=KαL1−α stated in terms of aggregate capital K and labor L, (ii) physical capital
depreciates at rate δ and (iii) population growth is n.
We deﬁne an equilibrium using the recursive language - see Huggett (1996). To keep track of agent
heterogeneity, we use probability measures ψj to describe the fraction of age j agents that have a state
vector x =( a,s,z) lying in particular subsets of the state space X. The relative size of diﬀerent age
cohorts is given by φj,w h e r eφj+1 = φj/(1 + n)a n d
 
j φj = 1. Denote aggregate capital, labor and













c(x,j)dψj. The probability measures must be consistent with one another. This is captured by
the recursion ψj+1 =Γ j(ψj), where Γj(ψj)(·) ≡
 
P(x,j,·)dψj,a n dP is a transition function induced by the
transition probabilities on shocks and by the period j decision rules. We do not write down all the details
associated with the construction of this transition function partly because the algorithm below calculates the
relevant integrals by simulating a large number of histories rather than by calculating probability measures
on a rich collection of subsets of the state space and then integrating. However, details of how to do so are
in Huggett (1996).
Deﬁnition: A stationary equilibrium is (c(x,j),l(x,j),a(x,j),w,r,G), tax-transfer functions (T1,...,TJ)
and probability measures (ψ1,...,ψJ) such that
1. (c,l,a) solve Bellman’s equation (Appendix A.1.1), given (w,r) and Tj.
2. w = F2(K,L) and r = F1(K,L) − δ






5. C + K(n + δ)+G = F(K,L)
Algorithm:
1. Fix (α,δ,n)=( .33,.06,.01).
2. Set r = .042 and w =1 .19461. Given (r,α,δ), equilibrium condition 2 pins down the wage w at the
value stated and pins down the capital-labor ratio K/L.
3. Guess the discount factor and average earnings (β,¯ e).
4. Compute decision rules (c,l,a) solving Bellman’s equation, given the information in steps 1-3 using
the procedures described in Appendix A.1.1.




Tj(x,wω(s,j)l(x,j))dψj) via simulation us-
ing the decision rules.




Tj(x,wω(s,j)l(x,j))dψj > 0, then stop. Otherwise, update
(β,¯ e)a n dr e p e a ts t e p s4 - 5 .
Comments:
1. We compute β for the full model at the parameters listed in Table 1 and ﬁx this value for all subsequent
analysis.
2. The initial value of β in step 3 is set to β =1 /(1 + r). In carrying out this algorithm we ﬁrst adjust
average earnings ¯ e in steps 3-6 until ¯ e  =¯ e.T h ev a l u e o f β is increased until step 6 approximately holds.
We choose ¯ e in step 3 because the tax-transfer function is only speciﬁed once ¯ e is known - see section 2.4.1.
29A.1.3. Planning Problem
We show how to compute V pp for the case of permanent shocks, given the value of Cost.T h es t r a t e g yi s
to analyze the Relaxed Problem. The Relaxed Problem is the same as the planning problem with permanent
shocks except that only the local downward incentive constraints are imposed rather than all the incentive
constraints. The local downward incentive constraints are the constraints stating that truth telling from
shock s dominates claiming to be one shock lower, denoted s−.T h e r ea r eN shock values that are ordered











j(cj(s) − wlj(s)s)/(1 + r)j−1]P(s) ≤ Cost
(ii)
 
j βj−1(u(cj(s)) + v(lj(s))) ≥
 
j βj−1(u(cj(s−)) + v(lj(s−)s−/s))),∀s>s 1
The strategy is to compute solutions to the Relaxed Problem and to verify that at the computed solution
all incentive constraints hold. We compute solutions to the Relaxed Problem by solving the Equivalent
Problem below. The Equivalent Problem is useful as it reduces the dimension of the control variables. The
claimed equivalence follows from several facts about solutions to the Relaxed Problem. Speciﬁcally, at a
solution (i) the cost constraint must hold with equality, (ii) consumption is chosen without intertemporal
distortion (i.e. u (cj(s)) = β(1 + r)u (cj+1(s)),∀j,s) and (iii) all local downward incentive constraints bind.
As the ﬁrst result is straightforward, we only formally state the last two in Theorem A1. Theorem A1
also provides an additional theoretical insight. Speciﬁcally, since the Lagrange multipliers on the incentive
constraints are strictly positive, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions imply that at a solution the intratemporal
marginal rate of substitution is strictly below labor productivity for all agents at any age except for the
agent with the highest productivity shock. This is a generalization of a standard result for the one-period
Mirrlees problem.
Theorem A1: Assume u(c,l)=u(c)+v(l), u and v are concave and diﬀerentiable, u and v are strictly
increasing and decreasing respectively. At an interior solution to the Relaxed Problem the following hold:








<w s ,∀j,∀s<s N and −
v (lj(s))
u (cj(s))
= ws,∀j and for s = sN.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
In the Equivalent Problem the choice variables are labor and the lifetime utility of consumption u(s). The
cost constraint makes use of the function COST. COST(u) describes the resource cost of obtaining lifetime
utility u from consumption, given that u (cj(s)) = β(1 + r)u (cj+1(s)).33 As all constraints are equality




j bj−1]1/(1−ρ),w h e r ea =
[β(1+r)]1/ρ
1+r
and b = β[β(1 + r)](1−ρ)/ρ.
30constraints, it is also possible to reduce dimensionality further by solving these constraints to express lifetime
utility of consumption u(s) as a function of all labor proﬁles l and Cost as follows: u(s)=g(l,s,Cost).
We use the simplex method from Press et al (1994) to solve the Equivalent Problem. This involves
maximizing over (l1(s),...,lR−1(s)), where R is the retirement period. These choices lie in an (R − 1) × N











j wslj(s)/(1 + r)j−1]P(s)=Cost
(ii) u(s)+
 
j βj−1v(lj(s)) = u(s−)+
 
j βj−1v(lj(s−)s−/s),∀s>s 1
A.1.4. Optimal Parametric Planning Problems
Weexaminea number of parametric tax systems. For any parametrictax system we choose the parameters
of these tax systems to maximize ex-ante utility, given that agents behave optimally and that the present
value resource constraint cannot be violated. We describe how we compute the optimal parametric tax
system for the case of a tax on the present value of earnings. The computation of other optimal parametric
tax systems is similar.
The agent’s problem and the planner’s problem are described below. The agent’s state variable is x =
(a,s,pv), where pv is the present value of earnings earned from previous periods. The tax function Tj maps
the present value of earnings from previous periods and earnings in period j into the tax paid or transfer
received in period j. Tj depends upon a parameter vector α. Solutions to the agent’s problem are computed
using the methods from section A.1.1.
Vj(a,s,pv;α)=m a x (c,l,a ) u(c,l)+β
 
s  Vj+1(a ,s  ,pv  ;α)π(s |s)
(1) c + a  ≤ a(1 + r)+wω(s,j)l − Tj(pv,wω(s,j)l;α)
(2) c ≥ 0,a   ≥ aj(s);l ∈ [0,1]
(3) pv  = pv +
wω(s,j)l
(1+r)j−1








(1+r)j−1 ] ≤ Cost
In the planner’s problem the only constraint facing the planner, given agent’s choices to any tax system
are optimal, is the cost constraint. This is because the allocation induced by a solution to the agent’s
problem is incentive compatible. We compute solutions to the planner’s problem by (i) drawing α, (ii)
computing optimal decision rules solving the agent’s problem, given α and (iii) simulating these decision
rules to determine whether or not the resource constraint is violated at the allocation induced by α.W e
use the simplex method to search over the space of parameters describing the tax function to maximize the
objective function. The objective function is ex-ante utility less a penalty term when the cost constraint is
violated.
We now describe how we choose the tax function Tj in the agent’s problem. Start with a tax function
T(pv;α) mapping the present value of realized earnings over the lifetime into the present value of taxes paid
31over the lifetime. Deﬁne the period tax function Tj(pv,wω(s,j)l;α) as indicated below. The tax paid in
period j is based on the increment added to the present value of earnings. By the end of the working lifetime,
the present value of taxes paid is simply T(pv;α), where pv is the realized present value of earnings over the
working lifetime. This is one way to carry out a present-value tax T with a period-by-period tax system Tj





(1+r)j−1;α) − T(pv;α)](1 + r)j−1 : j ≥ 2
T(wω(s,j)l;α):j =1
In our numerical implementation, we focus on two classes of parametric functions T. We use the class of
piecewise-linear functions for the full model and the class of increasing step functions T for the permanent-
shock model. We choose as many steps as there are permanent shocks.
A.2. Theorem A1
Theorem A1: Assume u(c,l)=u(c)+v(l), u is strictly concave and diﬀerentiable, v is concave and
diﬀerentiable, u and v are strictly increasing and decreasing respectively. At an interior solution to the
Relaxed Problem the following hold:








<w s ,∀j,∀s<s N and −
v (lj(s))
u (cj(s))
= ws,∀j and for s = sN.
Proof:
(i) We study the Lagrange function below. Let γ(s) denote multipliers on the local downward incentive
constraints and λ denote the multiplier on the resource constraint. A superscript + or − denotes one higher














j βj−1[u(cj(s)) + v(lj(s)) − u(cj(s−) − v(lj(s−)s−/s)]







βj−1u (cj(s))[P(s) − γ(s+)] − λP(s)/(1 + r)j−1 s = s1
βj−1u (cj(s))[P(s) − γ(s+)+γ(s)] − λP(s)/(1 + r)j−1 s1 <s<s N
βj−1u (cj(s))[P(s)+γ(s)] − λP(s)/(1 + r)j−1 s = sN
(1)
34Vickrey (1939) discusses some mechanics for a period-by-period tax system where taxes paid are based
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(1+r)j−1 s1 <s<s N
βj−1v (lj(s))[P(s)+γ(s)] +
λwsP(s)
(1+r)j−1 s = sN
(2)
Claims 1-4 establish that in a solution to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions all multipliers on incentive con-
straints are strictly positive: γ(s) > 0,∀s. Theorem A1(i) follows from this result.
Claim 1: For N ≥ 2,γ(sN) > 0.
Claim 2: For N>2,γ(s−)=γ(s) = 0 for any s is impossible.
Claim 3: For N>2,γ(s−) > 0,γ(s) = 0 for any s is impossible.
Claim 4: For N>2,γ(s2)=0 ,γ(s3) > 0 is impossible.
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 :I fγ(sN)=0 ,t h e ndL/dcj(s)=0a n du strictly concave implies cj(sN) ≤ cj(sN−1),∀j.
If γ(sN)=0 ,t h e ndL/dlj(s)=0a n dv concave implies lj(sN) >l j(sN−1),∀j. Thus, the downward incentive
constraint for the agent with shock sN is violated.
Proof of Claim 2: Suppose γ(s−)=γ(s)=0f o rs o m es.L e t s be the greatest s such that this holds.
Claim 1 implies that γ(s+) > 0. Then dL/dcj(s)=0a n du concave impliescj(s−) >c j(s),∀j. dL/dlj(s)=0
and v concave implies lj(s−) <l j(s),∀j. Thus, the downward incentive constraint for the agent with shock
s is violated.
Proof of Claim 3: Suppose γ(s−) > 0,γ(s)=0f o rs o m es.L e ts be greatest s such that this holds. Claim
1a n d2i m p l yγ(s+) > 0. Then dL/dcj(s)=0a n du concave implies cj(s−) >c j(s),∀j. dL/dlj(s)=0a n d
v concave implies lj(s−) <l j(s),∀j. Thus, the downward incentive constraint for the agent with shock s is
violated.
Proof of Claim 4: Suppose γ(s2)=0 ,γ(s3) > 0. Then dL/dcj(s)=0a n du concave implies cj(s1) >
cj(s2),∀j. dL/dlj(s)=0a n dv concave implies lj(s1) <l j(s2),∀j. This violates the downward incentive
constraint for the agent with shock s2.
(ii) This is implied by dL/dcj(s)=0 ,∀j.
(iii) dL/dlj(s)=0a n ddL/dcj(s) = 0 imply the equation below. The result then follows from the fact
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35Table 1: Parameter Values
Deﬁnition Symbol Value Source
Model Periods JJ = 56 Age 25 - 80
Retirement Period RR = 41 Kaplan (2007)


























Mean Productivity μj Figure 3 Kaplan (2007)








Social Security Tax ττ = .106 OASI tax rate
Beneﬁt Function b(x) Figure 1 SS Handbook (2003)
Income Tax Tinc Figure 2 CBO (2004)
Interest Rate rr =0 .042 Siegel (2002)
Discount Factor ββ = .98803 See Text
36Table 2: Welfare Gains to Optimal Parametric Reforms
Type of Reform Permanent-Shock Model Full Model
Reform 1: Change the 0.18 1.15
Beneﬁt Function
Reform 2: Tax the 3.95 -0.07
Present Value of Earnings
Reform 3: Eliminate 0.22 -0.22
Capital Income Taxation
Maximum Possible Gain 4.09 unknown
NOTE: The beneﬁt function is b(x;α)=
 3
i=1 αixi−1,w h e r ex is average lifetime earnings.
The present-value tax function T(pv;α)i sac l a s so fs t e pf u n c t i o n si nt h ep e r m a n e n t - s h o c k
model and is a class of piecewise-linear functions in the full model. See the Appendix.
37Figure legends
Figure 1: US Social Security Beneﬁt Formula. Source: Social Security Handbook (2003). Average
earnings and beneﬁt payments are both expressed as a multiple of average economy wide earnings.
Figure 2: Average Federal Income Tax Rates. Source: Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2004).
Figure 3: US Wage Proﬁle. Source: Kaplan (2007).
Figure 4: Inequality Over the Life Cycle - Full Model.
Figure 5a: Maximum Welfare Gains - Private Information. The bold vertical line in Figure 5
highlights the location of the point estimate of the variance described in the text.
Figure 5b: Maximum Welfare Gains - Private vs Public Information. The bold vertical line in
Figure 5 highlights the location of the point estimate of the variance described in the text.
Figure 6: Lifetime Taxation.
Figure 7a: Work Hours Proﬁles - Planning Problem - Permanent Shocks. Labor productivity
w(s,j) increases in the shock s. There are ﬁve possible shock values s1 <s 2 <s 3 <s 4 <s 5.
Figure 7b: Work Hours Proﬁles - Social Security with Income Tax - Permanent Shocks.
Labor productivity w(s,j) increases in the shock s. There are ﬁve possible shock values s1 <s 2 <s 3 <s 4 <
s5.
Figure 8: Consumption - Labor Wedge Social Insurance. Labor productivity w(s,j)i n c r e a s e si n
the shock s. There are ﬁve possible shock values s1 <s 2 <s 3 <s 4 <s 5.
Figure 9: Consumption - Labor Wedge Planning Problem. Labor productivity w(s,j)i n c r e a s e s
in the shock s. There are ﬁve possible shock values s1 <s 2 <s 3 <s 4 <s 5.
Figure 10: Lifetime Taxation: Full Model. The results for the Benchmark model and Reform 1 are
constructed by calculating the average present value of taxes paid for agents whose lifetime earnings fall in
diﬀerent lifetime earnings bins.
38Source: Social Security Handbook (2003).
Average earnings and benefit payments are both expressed as a multiple of average economy wide earnings.














PaymentSource: Congressional Budget Office (2004)



























Household Head is Under Age 65 Household Head is Age 65 or OlderSource: Kaplan (2007).


















































Wages Earnings Hours ConsumptionThe bold vertical line in Figure 5 highlights the location of the point estimate of the variance described in the text.
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Social Security with Income Tax Social Security without Income TaxThe bold vertical line in Figure 5 highlights the location of the point estimate of the variance described in the text.
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Social Security and Income Tax Planning Problem 45Labor productivity w(s, j) increases in the shock s. There are five possible shock values s_1 < s_2 < s_3 < s_4 < s_5.
























Shock s_1 Shock s_2 Shock s_3 Shock s_4 Shock s_5Labor productivity w(s, j) increases in the shock s. There are five possible shock values s_1 < s_2 < s_3 < s_4 < s_5.
























Shock s_1 Shock s_2 Shock s_3 Shock s_4 Shock s_5Labor productivity w(s, j) increases in the shock s. There are five possible shock values s_1 < s_2 < s_3 < s_4 < s_5.




















Shock s_1 Shock s_2 Shock s_3 Shock s_4 Shock s_5Labor productivity w(s, j) increases in the shock s. There are five possible shock values s_1 < s_2 < s_3 < s_4 < s_5.
























Shock s_1 Shock s_2 Shock s_3 Shock s_4 Shock s_5The results for the Benchmark model and Reform 1 are constructed by calculating the average present value of
taxes paid for agents whose lifetime earnings fall in different lifetime earnings bins.
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Benchmark Reform 1 Reform 2